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FEDERAL POWER, STATES' RIGHTS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS:
MENTALLY DISABLED PRISONERS AND
THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW ACTIVISM
This Note examines the situation of mentally disabled prisoners who seek to
assert their rights in federal court. Neither laws affecting the disabled nor laws
affecting prisoners receive heightened scrutiny by the judiciary, which, thus far,
also refuses to recognize the unique burdens of those who fit both categories.
Because mentally disabled prisoners do not qualifyfor heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause, recent developments in the federalism doctrine lead
the courts to conclude that they are without jurisdiction to hear suits brought by
prisoners against state penitentiaries. This Note explores the underpinnings of
federalism, separation ofpowers, and equal protectionjurisprudence, arguing that
states do not have the extensive sovereign immunity that the Supreme Court claims,
that Congress should be permitted to influence the level of scrutiny afforded to
claims brought by the disabled, and that the predicament of mentally disabled
prisoners warrants heightened scrutiny.
"Prejudice, once let loose, is not easily cabined."
- Justice Thurgood Marshall'
INTRODUCTION
Discrimination lurks at the confused intersection of mental health and criminal
justice. Mentally disabled prisoners defy easy definition. When a group of
individuals suffers prejudice based on a unique trait, the law can fairly readily
justify giving the group special consideration. When a group bears traits that
individually are not unique to it, but bears them in a combination that no other
group shares, the law has more difficulty recognizing the need for special
protection.' The plight of mentally disabled prisoners demonstrates the predicament
of multi-trait discrimination plaintiffs. In some respects, these individuals fit into
the general prisoner category; in others, the general disabled population. When
confronted with claims by disabled prisoners, courts consider each trait in turn, but
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,464 (1985).
2 See, e.g., DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(permitting plaintiffs to pursue separate claims for sex and race discrimination, but holding
that black women do not constitute a separate class: "[T]hey should not be allowed to
combine statutory remedies to create a new 'super-remedy' which would give them relief
beyond what the drafters of [each of] the relevant statutes intended." Id. at 143.), affd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977) (Marshall, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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do not take the extra step to consider them in combination.3 As a result, problems
truly unique to the group go unresolved.
When it passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),4 Congress provided
a beacon of hope. The ADA requires special consideration of the needs of disabled
individuals in all walks of life, including those in prison.5 While Congress
generally does not make legislation favorable to inmates,6 the ADA recognizes that
circumstances for the disabled are different.
The Supreme Court, in its recently rediscovered zeal for protecting states' rights
from federal intrusion, has whittled away the ADA's protections, with particularly
dire consequences for mentally disabled prisoners (MDPs). Although the Court has
not specifically addressed the problems faced by MDPs, several decisions over the
past half-decade allow the conclusion that for most prisoners, the ADA is not a
lifeline into court. At least one federal district court has dismissed a prisoner's
ADA claim, citing this line of Supreme Court decisions.7
The plight of MDPs presents a stew ofjurisprudential quandaries. Federalism
springs forth as perhaps the most obvious issue, but typical federalism analysis
oversimplifies the matter. Focusing on federal power versus state autonomy
obscures the conflict between states' rights and individual rights. Questions remain
as to whose rights are superior, and about who is best situated to protect individual
rights. The latter question further complicates matters because it involves both
federalism and separation of powers doctrine, and requires more than one answer:
Are the states best able to safeguard fundamental rights, or is the federal
government the most reliable and effective guardian? Even if the federal
government would serve as the better steward, does the Constitution permit it to
assume that role? Does it mandate it? Furthermore, would legislative action best
secure protection, or should the responsibility lie with courts? The very existence
of these questions raises yet another, which is perhaps the most important and most
complicated: Who is to decide?
Since its earliest years, the Supreme Court has claimed for the judicial branch
the power to decide the meaning of laws - including the Constitution.' But
American jurisprudence has an equally rich history of leaving questions of policy
3id.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2001).
' See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (holding that Congress
intended the ADA to apply to prisons); 28 C.F.R. § 35.190(b)(6) (1997) (Dep't of Justice
regulations implementing the ADA) (making specific references to correctional institutions
and inmates).
6 See Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2001).
7 Bane v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 110 F. Supp. 2d 469 (W.D. Va. 2000).
8 See, e.g., Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("Itis emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
[Vol. 10:3
MENTALLY DISABLED PRISONERS
to Congress.' Problems arise when issues can be categorized both as matters of
legal interpretation and of policy. Because the Supreme Court traditionally has had
the last word, judicial philosophy becomes critical; what the justices believe about
the proper roles of the various branches and of government as a whole motivates
their decisions. "Every judge approaches decisionmaking with a value-laden view
of the role of the courts."'" Although most judges emphatically deny that their
personal priorities play any role in their deliberations, it must necessarily be so: If
either categorization would be equally acceptable under law, something other than
law alone must influence the choice." By deciding how to characterize an issue,
the Court directly selects who will resolve it. When the Court knows how each
decision-making body is likely to decide, its selection essentially directs the
outcome.
The foundational question for the Court is whether it is better to allow the
policy-making branch to make interpretive decisions, or to allow the interpretive
branch to make policy decisions. The Court has long maintained that Congress has
not only the right, but also the duty, to decide the meaning of the Constitution. 2
Many justices have vehemently opposed judicial policymaking.' 3 The current
9 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 102 (1911) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("This court long ago deliberately held... [that
it] would encroach upon the authority of Congress if, under the guise of construction, it
should assume to determine a matter of public policy.").
0 Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of
Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REv. 200, 208 (1984).
" See, e.g., id. at 203, 207:
Whether a judge reasons forward from principles or backward from a result,
both a rational process and an expression of preferences are involved in varying
degrees ....
Whether the contending principles are complementary or contradictory, the
judge who would reason from principles toward a result is obliged to select from
among competing principles, and what is worth considering is not only the
process of reasoning from the selected principle, but, more important, the
thinking that influenced the initial selection. Values of some sort influenced the
judge to believe that one of two competing principles was the more pertinent.
Id. at 207.
"2 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,535 (1997) ('In 1789, when a Member of
the House of Representatives objected to a debate on the constitutionality of legislation..
James Madison explained that 'it is incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch
of the Government as to any other, that the constitution should be preserved entire."'
(quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789))).
'" See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Both
the allurement and the vice of (the methodology used by the Court] is that it provides broad
2002]
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Court, however, has mouthed those refrains while dancing a different step. Using
only its own constitutional interpretations, it has dramatically limited Congress'
ability to set a national policy course. 4
The issues surrounding mentally disabled prisoners can be characterized as
either law or policy. The minimum standards for treatment are clearly a matter of
law, but standards evolve. Deciding when and how much they evolve generates
much conflict. The function of each branch colors its view of the matter: Congress
sees it as a policy question; the Supreme Court beholds it as law. Of course, both
are correct. Whichever branch settles the issue will be making both law and policy.
Again, to which answer is the Constitution more amenable?
Mentally disabled prisoners face many hurdles. First, they must surmount the
legal barriers that all prisoners meet at the courthouse door. Once inside, they must
convince the judge that their dual-trait situation warrants greater scrutiny. Finally,
each must present the facts of his or her claim and persuade the court to do justice.
Every American with a legal complaint bears the burden of this last step. The first
two steps fall only on some. This inequity is the concern of this Note.
Several layers of larger issues underlie the legal difficulties of MDPs. Setting
the stage, Part I describes the current situation of MDPs and briefly explains the
mechanics of equal protection decisionmaking. Part II questions whether Eleventh
Amendment federalism is an appropriate vehicle for shielding state entities from
congressional enactments involving equal protection. The remainder of the Note
proceeds under the acknowledgement that the Supreme Court has made federalism
a centerpiece of current jurisprudence, and is unlikely to change its opinion in the
near future. Accordingly, Part III examines the requirements that Congress must
meet if it is to overcome the federalism barrier. Part I also discusses past
decisions in which the Court allowed congressional involvement in creating equal
protection policy. Part IV considers equal protection claims specifically involving
disability. This Part argues that the ADA's call for heightened scrutiny does not
contradict the Court's initial opinion on the matter. Although it took pains to
disclaim heightened scrutiny, that is what the Court actually applied. Part V shifts
to the prison setting, briefly discussing prisoner claims in general, before narrowing
the focus to examine the difficulties created when courts classify MDPs under
current standards.
scope for judicial lawmaking. We should have resisted that allurement today, as we resisted
it in the past.") (citations omitted).
'" See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[This decision] prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad
range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those





A. Prison and the Mentally Disabled
Jail time is longer and more difficult for mentally disabled prisoners. Under
current standards, states deny access to rehabilitation and treatment programs for
a significant number of prisoners with mental health problems. " In part, this results
when prison officials segregate MDPs from the general prison population, believing
that they cannot cope with integrated prison life.' Housing in separate facilities
"invariably results in a lack of access to prison treatment and rehabilitation
programs."' 7 In addition to depriving access, segregation actually harms those it is
supposed to help. Contrary to prison officials' assumptions, mental problems tend
to become worse in a segregated environment, where inmates lack physical and
mental stimulation. 8 This also compounds the access problem. Some prison
officials make rehabilitation programs available only to the inmates they believe
most likely to benefit from them.' 9 An injurious cycle results: The prisoners most
in need of rehabilitation programs are excluded from participation for the very
reason that their needs are higher than others; because they are excluded, they
cannot develop their coping skills and, as a consequence of the prison environment,
their mental health deteriorates, leaving them even less likely to be admitted to
rehabilitation programs.
Denial of access to a generally available program, by virtue of a trait not shared
with the general population, is a classic equal rights problem. The harm suffered
is evident. Unequal opportunity is not only simply unfair, but these prisoners suffer
clear, tangible detriment. In addition to being condemned to the inherent
difficulties of a downward mental health spiral, mentally disabled prisoners often
serve longer prison sentences than their non-disabled counterparts. Exclusion from
rehabilitation programs contributes to this in two ways. First, prisoners with
untreated mental disabilities are more likely to have discipline problems,"° making
them less eligible for early parole for good behavior. Second, completion of
rehabilitation programs, regardless of actual rehabilitation, is often a factor in a
parole board's decision to release.2 ' Excluded prisoners miss both the rehabilitation
and the formality. In effect, they are punished for being disabled.
Is T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications ofIncarcerationforPersons with Severe
Mental Disorders: Searchingfor Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 285
(1997).
16 Id. at 333.
1' Id. at 334.
11 Id. at 333-34. -
'9 Id. at 334.
'0 Id. at 300.
2' Stone, supra note 15, at 319 (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)).
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Under the current jurisprudential regime, these individuals are unable to seek
effective redress in court. When state courts cannot or will not stop discrimination,
the federal government must assume responsibility and direct the states to give all
citizens equal protection.22 The Supreme Court's activism in the realm of
federalism and separation of powers effectively obliterates the possibility of federal
involvement in rectifying this problem.
B. Equal Protection Mechanics
Equal protection of the law entitles similarly situated persons to similar
treatment and dissimilarly situated persons to dissimilar treatment.23 Anyjudicial
examination of legal rights based on the Equal Protection Clause begins with a
determination of which class the complainant fits, followed by a determination of
what sort of discriminatory treatment of that class the Constitution permits. The
process for the former is not well defined, leaving the decision to the discretion of
the judge.24
Standards do exist to help courts make the second determination. The standards
of judicial review serve as a series of progressively finer screens through which
government actions must pass in order to receive court approval. The more
stringent the review, the more likely that state actions will be held
unconstitutional.2" To determine which standard of review applies, a judge asks
whether the challenged action is intentionally discriminatory and invidious, and
whether the class being discriminated against is a "discrete and insular" minority
- one that historically has been subjected to discrimination and is politically
22 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
23 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1438 (2d ed. 1988).
' See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I
think we can do better than applying strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny whenever we
feel like it."); DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142 at 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(refusing to define African American women as a separate class).
25 Strict scrutiny almost invariably results in government action being ruled
unconstitutionally discriminatory. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989) (invalidating Richmond's plan requiring at least thirty percent of all public
construction funding to go to minority-owned businesses); Loving v. Virginia., 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (rejecting prohibition of interracial marriage); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880) (striking down statute creating all-white juries). On the other hand, action
reviewed under mere rationality is virtually always upheld. See, e.g;, Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991) (upholding mandatory retirement at age seventy for state judges); Ry.
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding prohibition of advertising
on vehicles except when the vehicle's owner advertised his own products).
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powerless." If these factors are present, a court applies strict" or intermediate"
scrutiny; if not, rational basis scrutiny governs.29 In practice, the Supreme Court has
found so few classifications to warrant heightened scrutiny3" that most lower courts
simply check to see if a complainant fits one of the previously elevated classes. If
the complainant does not have the necessary characteristics, the court proceeds with
rational basis review. How the court characterizes the complainant usually foretells
the outcome of the case.3'
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
With Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,32 the Supreme Court cast the die in
which it has molded current federalism doctrine. Previously, the Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment gives states sovereign immunity from suits brought by
individuals in federal court, unless the state waives immunity or Congress abrogates
it.3 3 The Court has found valid abrogation only when legislation clearly announced
that Congress so intended.34 In Seminole Tribe, the Court added a prong to the
abrogation test, asking, "[w]as the Act in question passed pursuant to a
constitutional provision granting Congress power to abrogate?"3 ' The Court held
that no such grant had existed until ratification of the Civil War Amendments.36
26 See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (listing factors leading to strict scrutiny).
27 Id.
28 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (explaining intermediate scrutiny
as applied to gender); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (listing factors leading to
intermediate scrutiny). This Note uses the term "heightened scrutiny" to mean either strict
or intermediate scrutiny.
' See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 222 U.S. 61 (1911) (explaining rational
basis review).
30 Only actions based on race, national origin, and sometimes alienage, or that impair a
fundamental right, are subject to strict scrutiny. Gender and illegitimacy receive mid-level
review. All other classifications are reviewed based on mere rationality - any imaginable
justification that does not violate the Constitution, and is related to a legitimate governmental
interest.
31 See TRIBE, supra note 23.
32 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
3 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
3' Id. at 240 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99
(1984)).
3- Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56
(1976)).
3 Id. ("[Tlhe Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at the expense of state
autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the
Constitution.... [Tlhrough the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended to intrude
upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment.... ."); see also infra, text accompanying
notes 81-90.
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WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Hence, the Court will uphold abrogation only if enacted pursuant to Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which explicitly gives Congress the power to control
state behavior. 7
Much of the discussion in the courts so far has turned on what sort of
congressional action overcomes the restrictions of the Eleventh Amendment. The
questions raised may not be as pivotal as is generally assumed. The Eleventh
Amendment itself may actually be something of a sheep that the Court has dressed
in wolf's clothing. Noticeably absent from the text of the amendment is a
prohibition on federal suits against a state by its own citizens. If the amendment's
framers did not intend it to be such an expansive font of immunity, federalism
doctrine would lose one of its most important justifications. A number of facts
suggest that the Framers did not intend the amendment to be read so broadly.
Many of the same people who framed the Constitution also drafted, and later
interpreted, the Eleventh Amendment. 8 Congress proposed the amendment in
response to the Supreme Court decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,39 which permitted
a citizen of South Carolina to sue Georgia.' Chisholm's "dissent provided the
blueprint for the. . . Amendment."' All of the justices in the 4-1 majority had
played large roles in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.42 The Court
held that the language of Article HI permitted the suit. Two justices also argued that
"the doctrine of sovereign immunity was incompatible with the premises of a
democratic republic in which the people placed their government as well as
themselves under the rule of law."43
The Article I language relied on by the Chisholm Court and the language used
in the Eleventh Amendment are strikingly similar- and equally striking where the
similarity ends. Section Two of Article III defines the scope of federal court
jurisdiction:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting
31 Section 5 states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." The Fifteenth Amendment contains a similar
enabling provision, U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2, but because the Amendment deals only
with voting, its application is limited, and it is essentially ignored in court and academic
discussion of abrogation. Congress' real power over states lies in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
38 Howard P. Fink, et al., Federal Courts in the 21st Century 231 (Michie ed. 1996).
39 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1791).
40 FINK, supra note 38.
41 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,76 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).




Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or more
States; - between a State and Citizens of another State; - between
Citizens of different States; -between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
Of these nine bases for federal jurisdiction, five include situations that at least
potentially involve states. The Eleventh Amendment mirrors portions of Section
Two, using virtually identical language, but "of the five situations in which federal
power had been granted to decide cases involving states, only two were made
subject to the Eleventh Amendment."'4 The entire amendment states: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit *in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."'
The amendment lends itself to two different readings. One, which Professor
Prince terms the "contextual" reading, interprets the amendment in the context of
Section Two, essentially splicing the provisions of the amendment into the relevant
parts of Section Two.4" Under this reading, only citizen-state diversity jurisdiction
and foreign diversity jurisdiction fall under the new restriction; federal question
jurisdiction survives for all plaintiffs. Early Supreme Court cases support the
contextual reading. For example, in Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that "a case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is
cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case."'
The second, "acontextual," reading "takes the language of the amendment
seriously, but it does so without regard for how it fits with the rest of the
Constitution, especially Article M."'49 Under this reading, the amendment prohibits
federal jurisdiction over all suits against states brought by citizens of another state
or country, whether based on diversity or on federal questions, but makes no
mention whatsoever of suits brought by citizens of the same state." Citizens of the
same state are, of course, inherently precluded from asserting diversity jurisdiction,
but Article HII, by its plain language, permits them to assert federal question
44 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
"s John Randolph Prince, Caught in a Trap: The Romantic Reading of the Eleventh
Amendment, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 411,421 (2000).
46 U.S. CONST. amend XI.
47 See Prince, supra note 45, at 421-22.
48 19 U.S. 264, 383 (1821).
49 Prince, supra note 45, at 418.
50 Id.
2002] 869
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jurisdiction: "all [c]ases... arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the
United States."'"
According to the acontextual interpretation, Chisholm was wrongly decided.
The contextual reading suggests that Chisholm was correct when decided, but, to
the extent that it allowed diversity jurisdiction, was overruled by the Eleventh
Amendment.52 Which reading is correct depends on what the Framers of the
Constitution actually intended regarding sovereign immunity.
The Framers could have addressed state immunity in one of three ways: by
eliminating it entirely, by granting immunity "subject to abrogation as to any matter
within .. . [federal] jurisdiction," or by granting total immunity from federal
jurisdiction. 3 At the constitutional convention, all discussion of immunity centered
on citizen-state diversity jurisdiction, and whether ratification would automatically
eliminate immunity or grant it subject to abrogation.' No record indicates that
anyone ever considered the third option, total immunity."5 "IT]here was - to say
the least - no consensus at the time of the Constitution's ratification as to whether
the doctrine of state sovereign immunity would have any application in federal
court."5 6 At any rate, the issue remained unresolved when the Constitution was
ratified. "The... [final] draft in fact said nothing on the subject.... .," One could
reasonably conclude that Article I did not eliminate immunity entirely, that
because no decision was made, pre-existing immunity remained intact after
ratification. 8 However, retaining the status quo also meant that immunity, in any
form, did not achieve the status of constitutional law. Instead, it remained a matter
of common law. "[T]he Founders' view [was] that common law, when it was
received into the new American legal system, was always subject to legislative
s' U.S. Const. art IH, § 2, cl. I (emphasis added).
52 See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 847 (1824) ("The
eleventh amendment of the constitution has exempted a State from the suits of citizens of
other States, or aliens .... .") (emphasis added).
13 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 104 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter's lengthy dissent provides an extensive account of the history of sovereign
immunity and the framing of the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment.
54 Id.
11 Id. at 106.
56 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, at 286 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
" Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 104 (Souter, J., dissenting); accord id. at 108 (quoting
CLYDE EDWARD JACOBS, ELEvENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNrTY 40 ("The
legislative history of the Constitution hardly warrants the conclusion drawn by some that
there was a general understanding, at the time of ratification, that the states would retain
their sovereign immunity.")).
" Cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401, 437 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting)
("[W]e have no other rule to govern us but the principles of the pre-existent laws, which
must remain in force till superceded by others . ..
[Vol. 10:3
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amendment." 9 This leads to the conclusion that Congress may abrogate immunity
simply by passing appropriate legislation, without the sanction of "an affirmative
constitutional grant of authority," as required by the Seminole Tribe Court.
Just as the Framers had various choices in how they dealt with state immunity,
so does the Court. And just as the Framers could not settle on a solution, the Court
is uncomfortable with each of the possibilities it might choose. The Court refuses
to accept the contextualist outcome, which allows broad federal jurisdiction. The
acontextual reading also creates a result that the Court finds discomfiting: "[l]f
New Jersey violates federal law and hurts two persons, one a citizen of New Jersey
and one of Pennsylvania, only the former and not the latter could bring suit in
federal court."' Justice Scalia addressed this result in his dissent in Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Company:
[T]here is no plausible reason why one would wish to protect a State from
being sued in federal court for violation of federal law ... when the
plaintiff is a citizen of another State or country, but to permit a State to be
sued there when the plaintiff is citizen of the State itself.62
To avoid this anomaly, the Court has two choices: accede to the contextualist
reading, and allow both plaintiffs to bring suit, or refuse jurisdiction to both.
Neither choice adheres strictly to the language of the amendment - one prohibits
more than specified; the other, less - but as Justice Scalia noted, under a literal
reading of the text:
[lt would unquestionably be most reasonable to interpret it as providing
immunity only when the sole basis of federal jurisdiction is the diversity
of citizenship that it describes. . . . Thus, unless some other
constitutional principle beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment
confers immunity ... even if the parties to a suit fell within [the
Amendment's] precise terms ... sovereign immunity would not exist so
long as [federal question] jurisdiction existed.63
In Hans v. Louisiana, the Court rejected the possibility that non-citizens could avoid
the Eleventh Amendment by claiming a federal cause of action." Rather than
viewing the amendment as having changed Section Two in response to Chisholm,
'9 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 102 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60 Id.
61 Prince, supra note 45, at 418.
62 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63 Id. (first emphasis added).
6 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
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the Hans Court stated that Chisholm had misinterpreted the grant ofjurisdiction, a
mistake that the amendment corrected.65 Tojustify rejecting the contextual reading,
the Hans Court sought, and the current Court reiterates, the "other constitutional
principle beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment" to which Justice Scalia
alluded. The Court elevated the amendment's importance beyond its mere words,
implying that it reflects the spirit of the Constitution and the age in which it was
adopted. According to Justice Scalia:
[A] consensus that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, for States as well
as for the Federal Government, was part of the understood background
against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional
provisions did not mean to sweep away. "[T]he cognizance of suits and
actions [against unconsenting States] was not contemplated by the
Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United
States."
66
The Hans Court stated that Chisholm was "startling and unexpected.., and created
such a shock of surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of
Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment . . . was almost unanimously
proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the States."'
The Hans Court inappropriately extended state immunity as a shield against
federal question jurisdiction. Chisholm was not startling. There was no consensus
about sovereign immunity at the time of the Founding - the concept appears
nowhere in the Constitution precisely because there was no consensus. The Hans
Court fabricated the sense of urgency that it claimed surrounded the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment. The Court was technically correct that the amendment was
proposed "at the first meeting thereafter," but in fact, Congress was in session when
the Court announced Chisholm. Although two congressmen proposed versions of
the amendment in the days after the announcement, the "almost unanimous"
proposal to the states did not come until the "first meeting thereafter" - the
following year. The Court also completely ignored the first of the two proposed
amendments, which would have embodied the expansive immunity that the Court
continues to claim imbued the spirit of the age:
[No] State shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the
Judicial Courts established or to be established under the authority of the
65 Id. at 15 ("[Chisholm] is an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a
construction never imagined or dreamed of.").
66 Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at
15).
67 Hans, 134 U.S. at 11.
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United States, at the suit of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners,
or of any body politic or corporate whether within or without the United
States.68
The second proposal was virtually identical to the Amendment as adopted.69
The current Court insists that any congressional abrogation of state immunity
must be made pursuant to constitutional authorization, and that the Eleventh
Amendment proves that no such authorization existed until the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. Given the two proposals Congress chose from, the
Court's claims of consensus are nearly laughable. "Even if there had been such a
consensus, however, the Eleventh Amendment would represent a particularly
cryptic way to embody that consensus in the Constitution."7 The keys to a more
appropriate contemporary reading of the Eleventh Amendment lie in the founding
document itself. Two "other constitutional principles" offer explicit and plain
guidance: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,"7' and "the Laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land."'7
Rules for interpreting [Section] 5 that would provide States with special
protection... run counter to the very object of the Fourteenth Amendment.
By its terms, that Amendment prohibits States from denying their citizens
equal protection of the laws. Hence "principles of federalism that might
otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily
overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by
appropriate legislation.' Those Amendments were specifically designed as
an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty.""
The Civil War Amendments changed the way the country looked at the federal/state
relationship, eliminating any uncertainty about immunity. The amendments did not
merely provide a grant of authority to abrogate immunity, they defined the spirit of
the Constitution, and continue to serve as the lens through which to view the rest
68 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 283-84 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (alteration in original). Justice Brennan noted that "[t]he resolution was not
reported in the Annals of Congress, but was reported in contemporary newspaper accounts."
Id. at n.35 (citing John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A Reinterpretation, 83 COLum. L. REv. 1889 (1983)).
69 See id. at 285.
70 Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72 Id. at art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
7' Garrett v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. 356, 388 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980)).
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of the document. The Eleventh Amendment, read in context, does not bar federal
question suits against states by their own citizens. Therefore, Congress' power over
the states need not arise solely from the Fourteenth Amendment. That power should
properly extend much further than the Court presently permits.
I]I. CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGULATION OF STATE BEHAVIOR
AND THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW ACTIVISM
Although the Supreme Court has made efforts to define equal protection
standards for inmates in general, Congress has also acted where disabled inmates
are concerned. The ADA injected new vigor into questions about the appropriate
standard of review. The final answer rests with the Court, but Congress, whether
intentionally or not, has influenced the debate. Several cases from the last two
decades illustrate how the judiciary deals with input from the legislative branch.
These decisions prepared the way for the answer to whether Congress may
constitutionally require state adherence to federal discrimination statutes.
A. The Court Approves, then Disapproves...
In EEOC v. Wyoming, the Court held that the Commerce Clause enables
Congress to extend discrimination protection to state employees, but articulated
Tenth Amendment concerns about state sovereignty. 4 Despite those concerns, the
Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act" (ADEA) applied to
state and local governments."6 The ADEA allowed those entities to discriminate
based on age only if they could "demonstrate that age is a 'bona fide occupational
qualification.' for a specific job."
The Commerce Clause rationale met rejection in 1996 when the Seminole Tribe
Court restricted Congressional abrogation of state immunity to legislation enacted
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 By restricting federal court jurisdiction over
suits against states, Seminole Tribe paved the way for a number of cases in which
the Court has further cemented the move toward state immunity from federal action.
A year after Seminole Tribe, the Court decided City of Boerne v. Flores,9
narrowing the scope of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority. In 1993,
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (hereinafter RFRA)80 in
11 460 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1983) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)), overruled by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
s 29 U.S.C. § 621.
76 EEOC, 460 U.S. at 229.
" Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
71 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
79 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2001).
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response to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith.8 1 Smith held that "neutral laws of general applicability 8 2 may curtail
religious practices, even if lacking a compelling governmental interest. 3 Congress
sought to restore the compelling interest requirement, 4 and expressly made RFRA
applicable to all state statutes and common law." The Boerne Court held that
RFRA exceeded the enforcement power granted to Congress by Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
6
The Court stated that Section Five only permits Congress to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment - to remedy or prevent discrimination - not to
"determine what constitutes a constitutional violation," 87 a task the Court reserved
to itself8 According to the Court, RFRA attempted to supersede the Court's
decision in Smith. 9 Using the Fourteenth Amendment as justification for the law
implied that, in Congress' opinion, such government action violates the
Constitution. This view directly contradicts the Court's opinion on the matter.
Jealously guarding its role as constitutional interpreter, the Court invalidated the
Act.9o
The Court again invalidated an express congressional abrogation of state
immunity in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank.' Congress had amended the patent laws, intending to make clear
that state entities are subject to suit in federal court for patent infringement.92
Refusing to dismiss the suit on Seminole Tribe sovereign immunity grounds, the
federal circuit court of appeals "reasoned that patents are property subject to the
protections of the Due Process Clause, and that Congress' objective in enacting the
Patent Remedy Act was permissible because it sought to prevent States from
depriving patent owners of this property without due process."'93 The Supreme
Court agreed that patents are property subject to congressional action under the
81 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
82 Id. at 901 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'I Id. at 885-86.
84 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2001).
'" Id. at § 2000bb-2(i).
86 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
87 Id. at 519.
88 Id. at 536.
'9 Id. at515-16.
'0 Id. at 536.
"' 527 U.S. 627 (1999). Florida Prepaid had a companion case of the same name, 527
U.S. 666 (1999), in which the Court declared that states do not waive their sovereign
immunity by engaging in commerce.
9' Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h),
296(a) (2001).
9' Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633.
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Fourteenth Amendment," but reversed the circuit court on due process grounds.
The Court held that "a State's infringement of a patent ... does not by itself violate
the Constitution. Instead, only where the State provides no remedy, or only
inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners... could a deprivation of property
without due process result."'5 Finding that Congress had established no record of
inadequate state remedies, the Court held that the Patent Remedy Act was a
disproportionate response to the behavior Congress intended to remedy, and so was
not proper remedial Section Five legislation. 6
With this set of precedents in place, the Court revisited the ADEA. In Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, 7 the Court rejected its earlier Commerce Clause
justification, citing Seminole Tribe." It then stated, pursuant to Boerne, that
Congress could not determine the substance of Fourteenth Amendment protection:
Congress cannot decide what is constitutional and what is not. The Court professed
that only it may do so, noting that in Gregory v. Ashcroft" it had stated that courts
need only a rational connection to a legitimate state interest- to justify age
discrimination."° Finally, the Court held that the ADEA exceeds the scope of
congressional action permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment."0 ' Therefore,
Congress did not validly abrogate state immunity. 102
Kimel neatly summarized the Court's requirements for legislation affecting the
ability of citizens to sue their state government under federal law. A valid statute
must explicitly state Congress' intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. Such
a statute may seek to remedy and deter the infringement of individual rights, but
may not decree what those rights are. Congress must identify a pattern of state
violations that require federal remedial action. Finally, a valid statute must
reasonably tailor the remedy to the violations it seeks to redress.
The Court came one step closer to addressing disabled prisoners' rights when
it decided Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett. 3 The case
specifically dealt with the ADA's application to state entities. Garrett combined
the claims of two Alabama state employees who suffered job discrimination.' A
state hospital did not permit Patricia Garrett to resume her job as the director of
14 Id. at 642.
9" Id. at 643.
96 Id. at 646.
97 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
n Id. at 78.
99 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
,oo Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
101 Id. at 91.
102 Id.
,03 531 U.S. 356(2001).
"04 Id. at 362-63.
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nursing after taking substantial leave following cancer surgery and treatment. 05
Instead, she "applied for and received a transfer to another, lower paying position
as a nurse manager."'' At the time he was hired, Milton Ash requested that his
duties be modified to accommodate his asthma, and later asked to change shifts
when he was diagnosed with sleep apnea.'07 The state honored neither request, and
after Ash filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, "he
noticed that his performance evaluations were lower than those he had received on
previous occasions."' 8 Both employees filed ADA claims in federal court seeking
money damages."° The Eleventh Circuit consolidated the cases and, asserting that
the ADA was a valid abrogation of immunity, reversed the trial court's grants of
summary judgment for the state."' The Supreme Court affirmed the district court
holding, extensively citing Seminole Tribe, Boerne, Florida Prepaid, and Kimel."'
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist also frequently cited City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,12 the Court's 1985 decision purportedly
holding that disability warrants only rational basis review."' The Chief Justice
assembled these cases into a rejection of the Garrett claims, contending that the
ADA does not bind the states because Congress did not validly abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment." 4 He based this holding on the evidence, gathered by
Congress, that states engaged in disability discrimination, 'evidence he found
inadequate:" 5 "[T]hese incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the
pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which [Section] 5 legislation must be
based."' " As such, Congress did not establish the kind of state behavior that the
Fourteenth Amendment allows it to regulate." 
7
These cases demonstrate the Court's ongoing effort to curb federal power over
the states. The Court has strengthened the federalist position with each decision,
insulating the states from Congress' reach with successive layers of new precedent,
105 Id. at 362.
"06 Id. (citation omitted).
107 Id.
1o8 Id.
109 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362.
110 Id. at 363.
III Id., passim.
112 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
' Id. at 442; see also infra Part IV.
114 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
"I Id.
16 Id. at 370 (citations omitted).
117 The Court's argument seems to invalidate all ADA application to the states. Curiously,
the Court limited its decision to individuals seeking money damages from states. "[ADA]
standards can [still] be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well
as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Exparte Young." Id. at 374
n.9.
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each time making it more difficult for Congress to influence how states treat
individuals. Disabled state prisoners' ability to find shelter in the ADA has become
an increasingly distant possibility as the Court has plotted its course away from
federal involvement.
B ... But Disapp.-oval is Qualified
Garrett and its predecessors drew sharp lines dividing the constitutional
decision-making roles of Congress and the Supreme Court. The opinions dismissed
the part Congress is to play, occasionally paying lip service to the legislative
branch's capacity to make constitutional judgments, 8 but in the end disregarded
those judgments. The roles of the two branches have not always been so
segregated. Congress has had an active leadership function in other developments
of similar constitutional import, which set a precedent for its participation in dealing
with disability discrimination. In enacting the ADA, Congress carried its traditional
involvement forward. The Court's position has ignored that precedent.
As the district court for the Western District of Virginia pointed out, Congress
sought to place disability among those attributes that trigger a heightened level of
court scrutiny.' 9 Congress used specific language when drafting the ADA, making
this intention clear:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society. 20
This language mirrors that used by the Supreme Court to justify elevating other
classifications above rational basis review. The distinction is critical: If disability
discrimination is subject to rational basis review, the only unconstitutional state
behavior would be that which has no imaginable rational connection to a legitimate
state goal. Any rational state discrimination would fall outside the reach of the
ADA and the courts. If disability discrimination is subject to heightened review,
a significant number of state discriminatory policies and programs might not pass
118 See, e.g., id. at 365 ("Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this
Court's constitutional jurisprudence.").
"1 Bane v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 110 F. Supp. 2d 469,476 (W.D. Va. 2000).
120 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7) (emphasis added).
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constitutional muster; states would bear the burden of showing that discrimination
is justifiable.
The Court's repeated assertions that it alone has "the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation"'' belie the reality that in the past Congress
has played an important role in making that determination. Before 1971, courts
reviewed gender discrimination cases under the rational basis test. That year, the
Court decided Reed v. Reed, in which a woman challenged an Idaho law favoring
men as administrators of estates." The Court presumed to decide the case under
rational basis, but held that the law's preference was impermissibly arbitrary,
despite observing that "the objective ... is not without some legitimacy."'23 The
decision signaled a willingness to examine gender discrimination cases more closely
than traditional rational basis review would permit.
Two years later, the Court revisited the issue in Frontiero v. Richardson,
making explicit the "departure from 'traditional' rational-basis analysis," which it
deemed was "clearlyjustified."' 4 The Court listed numerous criteria supporting the
decision, including the history of discrimination suffered by women and the
stereotyped distinctions that pervaded the law, drawing analogies between gender
and race.'25 Significantly, the Court also cited Congress' efforts and attitude as
support for elevating gender to strict scrutiny review:
We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has itself
manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. In [Title]
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, Congress expressly
declared that no employer, labor union, or other organization subject to the
provisions of the Act shall discriminate against any individual on the basis
of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Similarly, the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 provides that no employer covered by the Act "shall
discriminate... between employees on the basis of sex." And § 1 of the
Equal Rights Amendment, passed by congress on March 22, 1972, and
submitted to the legislatures of the States for ratification, declares that
"[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex." Thus, Congress itself has
concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and
this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without
significance to the question presently under consideration." 6
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
122 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
123 Id. at 76.
124 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
'2' Id. at 685.
126 Id. at 687-88 (last emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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This acknowledgement has not held considerable weight in the more recent Court
opinions discussing equal protection. Although it has not gone unnoticed in the
words of the opinions, it holds no precedential sway in their conclusions. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court in Boerne, noted that Congress has "not just the
right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of
the Constitution." '27 This very duty allows acts of Congress to take effect without
undergoing constitutional scrutiny until brought to the courts by a party alleging
injury therefrom. Despite his acknowledgement, Justice Kennedy disregarded
Congress' "informed judgment," noting that "[w]hen the Court has interpreted the
Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which
embraces the duty to say what the law is." ' Justice Kennedy stated that "[o]ur
national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part
of the government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and
determinations of the other branches."'2 9 It seems the Court has not learned the
lessons of this national experience very well. When the Court asserts the
superiority of its own constitutional decisionmaking as acting "within the province
of the Judicial Branch," it implies that when Congress interprets the Constitution,
it unjustifiably intrudes into the Court's exclusive domain. In fact, when Congress
interprets the Constitution, it acts within the province of the legislative branch,
which, as Justice Kennedy himself noted, embraces the duty to say what the
Constitution means. The duties of the branches are not identical. Congress' power
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is "corrective or preventative."'
30
The power of the judiciary is "to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy
.... "131 The ADA set out to make official policy of Congress' desire to correct and
prevent disability discrimination. The Court's decision not to allow that policy to
take shape demeans Congress' constitutional role.
C. The Dissents
Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Boerne, agreed that "Congress lacks the ability
independently to define or expand the scope of constitutional rights by statute," but
went on to say that "[t]his recognition does not, of course, in any way diminish
27 Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 535.
128 Id. at 536 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). Note that
Justice Kennedy relied on the famous proclamation by Chief Justice John Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." Id. Chief Justice Marshall's little-disguised purpose in rendering that
decision was to enlarge the power of the federal government over the states.
' Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36.
'10 Id. at 525.
"' Id. at 524.
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Congress' obligation to draw its own conclusions regarding the Constitution's
meaning. Congress, no less than this Court, is called upon to consider the
requirements of the Constitution and to act in accordance with its dictates."' 3 1 This
suggests a more appropriate method for dealing with constitutional questions, a
cooperative approach in which the past decisions of both Congress and the Court
inform the subsequent conclusions of both branches. Justice Stevens endorsed this
approach in his Florida Prepaid dissent, concluding that the Court incorrectly
overruled the Patent Remedy Act's abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment:
"Congress decided, and I agree, that the Patent Remedy Act was a proper exercise
of this power."' 33
Justice Stevens also dissented from the Court's diminution of congressional
power in Kimel. Noting that "the ancient judge-made doctrine of sovereign
immunity ... is supposedly justified as a freestanding limit on congressional
authority," he nonetheless rejected the Court's assumption of the role as "guardian
of those state interests."' 34 Rather than interposing the Court between Congress and
the states, the Founders intended that the structure of the federal government would
keep Congress' power in check. James Madison wrote:
The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts
of the federal government .... The Senate will be elected absolutely and
exclusively by the State legislatures .... Thus, [it] will owe its existence
more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently
feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too
obsequious than too overbearing towards them.'
Justice Stevens noted that when Congress abrogates state sovereign immunity, "we
can safely presume that the burdens the statute imposes on the sovereignty of the
several States were taken into account during the deliberative process leading to the
enactment of the measure.',
136
Differences in the processes of the two branches figured strongly in Justice
Breyer's dissent in Garrett. Justice Breyer chided the Court for holding Congress
to judicial evidentiary standards, rather than allowing it to draw its conclusions
using legislative information-gathering methods.'37 Justice Breyer noted that
'32 Id. at 545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
11 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 652 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'3 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). Note that
the states no longer elect the Senate. The Seventeenth Amendment gave that power directly
to the people. U.S. CONST. amend XVII, § 1.
6 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment "'empowers Congress to enforce [the
equal protection] mandate,"' warranting Court deference to its decisions in that area
of law."3 In order to avoid giving that deference, the Court subjected the ADA's
legislative history to an unprecedented level of scrutiny. Writing for the Court, the
Chief Justice stated that Congress' evidence was inadequate reason to abrogate state
immunity, that individual instances of discrimination reported by Congress did not
carry sufficient weight where state behavior was concerned. Arriving at this
conclusion required the Court to subject those findings to evidentiary standards
better suited to judicial inquiry." Requiring more voluminous evidence departs
from past Court practice, which "never required the sort of extensive investigation
of each piece of evidence that the Court appears to contemplate."'' Traditionally,
the Court has deferred to the conclusions drawn by Congress. In US. Railroad
Retirement Boardv. Fritz, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[w]here, as here, there are
plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course,
'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative
decision,' because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its
reasons for enacting a statute."' 42
Until very recently, the Supreme Court has acted in accordance with its
protestations of respect for the separation of powers. Previously, it has shown
deference for congressional opinion on matters of constitutional import. As the
evolution of gender discrimination doctrine demonstrated, the Court took very
seriously legislative conclusions about what sorts of discrimination rational basis
review cannot adequately address. This is a far cry from the Court's position in
Boerne:
When the political branches of the Government act against the background
of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be
understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its
precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including
stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.'43
13 Id. at 383 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985)
(alteration in original)).
139 Id. at 370 (opinion of the Court).
140 Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
,41 Id. at 380 (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-56 (1966)) ("Congress
might well have questioned .... Congress might well have concluded .... Since Congress
undertook to legislate so as to preclude the enforcement of the state law, and it did so in the
context of a general appraisal ... it was Congress' prerogative to weigh these competing
considerations.").
142 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)).
143 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
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Here the Court purported to show great deference for its own precedent, but stare
decisis is the only settled principle it appears to have considered when weighing
how much respect was due. This is especially peculiar in light of the fact that, only
two sentences later, the Court invoked another settled principle: "It is for Congress
in thefirst instance to 'determine whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and its conclusions are entitled to
much deference."'" The primary consideration seems to be, "Which branch got
there first?" This might be justifiable if the Court applied it consistently. The Court
drew its conclusion about disability claims in 1985, in Cleburne, and Congress did
so in 1990, in the ADA, whereas the Frontiero Court deferred to congressional
conclusions that were made before the Court decided on the standard of review for
gender discrimination claims. However, the Frontiero Court did not have only
Congress' work to consider. It had to confront its own prior holding in Reed, that
gender was subject only to rational basis review. The Court managed to disregard
that precedent, yet claims to be bound by Cleburne.
One of the key policies supporting stare decisis addresses the reliance placed
on precedent by states and individuals when structuring their behavior.'45 Justice
Scalia has said:
I had thought that the respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather than
decreases, with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence
.... The freshness of error not only deprives it of the respect to which
long-established practice is entitled, but also counsels that the opportunity
of correction be seized at once.'46
Congress concluded that Cleburne 's purported use of rational basis review 47 was
inadequate to deal. with the problems faced by the disabled, and it passed the ADA
in response. As a five-year-old precedent, the case had not acquired the respect of
a "long-established practice."' 48 Neither had society adjusted itself to Cleburne 's
existence. In fact, just the opposite occurred: Congress, the representative branch,
codified society's growing distaste for this sort of discrimination.
The Court's claim to be bound by precedent grows increasingly feeble upon
further examination of the supposedly binding case. Cleburne itself states that
"Section Five of the [Fourteenth] Amendment empowers Congress to enforce [the
'" Id. (emphasis added).
'. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
", South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141 See infra Part IV (disputing the rational basis label).
148 Cf. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It
cannot be credibly maintained that a State's ordering of its affairs with respect to potential
liability under federal law requires adherence to Seminole Tribe, as that decision leaves open
a State's liability upon enforcement of federal law by federal agencies.").
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equal protection] mandate."' 49 The judiciary sometimes sets the standard, but only
"absent controlling congressional direction."'" The Court engages in absurdity
when it refuses to grant deference to a congressional conclusion, and does so based
on a decision that it was forced to make only because a congressional conclusion
was absent. The Court's refusal, in Garrett and other cases, 5 ' to revise the label
placed on the Cleburne standard does not comport with stare decisis. Instead, it
sets new, erroneous precedent on which the judiciary relies as it continues on the
present course away from individual rights.
The Court's desire to prevent Congress from regulating state behavior has led
it to intrude on the constitutional domain of the legislative branch. Garrett and its
predecessors have shifted the balance of power in America. They have augmented
the authority of the states and the Court, and diminished the power of Congress and
the people.
IV. CLEBURNE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
DISCRIMINATING AGAINST THE DISABLED
Just as the Frontiero Court acknowledged congressional involvement in gender
discrimination doctrine, Justice Marshall recognized Congress' equal protection
role in disability discrimination. In his Cleburne dissent, he urged that
discrimination legislation reflects "evolving standards of equality [and that] courts
should look to the fact of such change as a source of guidance on evolving
principles of equality."' 12 Like the Frontiero Court, Justice Marshall saw the
inadequacy of the rational basis test in dealing with certain types of discrimination,
and like that Court, he called the standard of review what he saw it to be. The
Cleburne majority followed the model of the Reed Court, claiming to use rational
basis analysis, but invalidating the law in question despite the existence of a
plausible rationale.5 3 Justice Marshall dissented not from the judgment, but from
the majority's claim that it was able to reach that judgment using nothing more than
rational basis.'54
The ordinance at issue in Cleburne required the plaintiff, Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. (hereinafter CLC), a prospective group home for the mentally retarded,
to obtain a special use permit to locate its facilities on the property proposed for the
home. The city counsel held public hearings and subsequently denied the permit.
' City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985) (emphasis added).
15o id.
' E.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993). For a discussion of Heller, see infra text
accompanying note 174.
1' Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
153 Id. at 450 (opinion of the Court).
'14 Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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CLC filed suit against the city, alleging violation of CLC's and its potential
residents' rights under the Equal Protection Clause. ro' The district court upheld the
ordinance, but the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision, finding that mental
retardation warrants the same protection as gender.'' Examining the ordinance
with heightened scrutiny, the appellate court held the ordinance facially invalid for
lack of an important governmental purpose.' The Supreme Court reversed that
holding, but affirmed the judgment. It stated that heightened scrutiny is
inappropriate,' but that even under the less restrictive standard, the ordinance
violated the plaintiffs' rights.5 9 The Court rendered a detailed explanation
opposing heightened scrutiny, but then proceeded to analyze the facts in a manner
remarkably similar to heightened scrutiny." The Court's most serious break from
traditional rational basis review came when it assigned the burden of proof.
Ordinarily, courts presume government actions to be valid unless the party
challenging the action shows cause for finding otherwise. "' The Court repeated the
phrases "rational basis-" 2 and "rationally justify'" throughout its discussion, but
with equal frequency recited "in our view the record does not reveal..."' and "the
City never justifies .... "" Under a true rational basis analysis, the Court would
not have required the City of Cleburne to assert any justification, and the Court
would not have "sift[ed] through the record to determine whether policy decisions
are squarely supported by a firm factual foundation."'" Courts normally reserve
this level of analysis for heightened scrutiny."'
The Court's so-called rational basis analysis is particularly striking considering
the unambiguous tone of prior opinions, and the vigor with which some justices
joining the opinion had previously asserted the minimal nature of rational basis
review. For example, in United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno, then-
Justice Rehnquist dissented from a decision to invalidate a congressional limitation
on food stamp eligibility.'" He stated his disbelief that "asserted congressional
concern with the fraudulent use of food stamps is, when interpreted in the light most
'" Id. at 437 (opinion of the Court).
136 Id. at 437-38.
117 Id. at 438.
"' Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
1'9 Id. at 450.
'60 Id. at 442-50.
161 Id. at 459 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 448.
163 Id. at 450.
6 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
163 Id. at 450 (opinion of the Court).
'16 Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17 See id. at 459-60.
68 Id. at 528.
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favorable to sustaining the limitation, quite as irrational as the Court seems to
believe."'69 He went on to say, "[t]he fact that the limitation will have unfortunate
and perhaps unintended consequences beyond this does not make it
unconstitutional."'7 ° Nine years later in Zobel v. Williams, Justice Rehnquist again
dissented emphatically from a decision to invalidate a regulation on equal protection
grounds:
This Court has long held that state economic regulations are presumptively
valid, and violate the Fourteenth Amendment only in the rarest of
circumstances: "When local economic regulation is challenged solely as
violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to
legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory
discriminations.... [O]ur decisions presume the constitutionality of the
statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. States are accorded wide
latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers,
and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than
mathematical exactitude."''
1 1
The contrast between Justice Rehnquist's language and that of the Court in
Cleburne indicates either a relaxing of the minimalist interpretation advocated by
Justice Rehnquist or an abandonment of rational basis inquiry in all but name.'72
Justice Marshall expressed his opinion - and approval - that the Court actually
decided Cleburne using heightened scrutiny, chiding the decision primarily for
failure to state the true nature of the analysis.'7
The question remains officially unresolved. Unlike Reed and Frontiero,
Cleburne did not fird a clarifying companion to lift disability discrimination
doctrine out of its confused state. Instead, the Court later heard Heller v. Doe,
another claim of state discrimination against the mentally retarded.'7 4 Rather than
delivering a reprise of Cleburne's unanimous grant of relief to the plaintiffs, the
Heller Court split 5-4 in favor of letting the discriminatory conduct stand.
169 413 U.S. at 546 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
170 Id. at 547.
171 457 U.S. 55, 81-82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (citations omitted)).
172 Compare Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REv. 357 (discussing "heightened
rationality"), with TRIBE, supra note 23, at 1594-95 n.20 ("[Tlhe Court apparently applied
heightened review in the guise of minimum rationality.").
113 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,459-60 (1985) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
174 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
[Vol. 10:3
MENTALLY DISABLED PRISONERS
Eschewing the example set in Frontiero, the Court retreated from Cleburne's more
probing analysis, citing support from a number of cases that implemented the highly
deferential standard called for by Justice Rehnquist in Moreno and Zobel'75
Indeed, the majority opinion cited Cleburne only a single time, neither overruling
it nor reaffirming its validity. That the majority even mentioned Cleburne at all
could almost go unnoticed. The citation came at the end of a paragraph with more
than a dozen other citations, and did not occasion any discussion specifically
addressing its decision or analysis.' Lumping Cleburne with another case, the
Court spared two sentences by way of comment: "We have applied rational-basis
review in previous cases involving the mentally retarded and the mentally ill. In
neither case did we purport to apply a different standard of rational-basis review
from that just described.""'
The focus of legal analysis is properly on practical workings, not on formal
classifications.' Whereas the Frontiero Court adopted the spirit of Reed,
essentially changing the doctrine in name only, the Heller Court did the opposite,
using the semantics of Cleburne to justify a result not supported by the true
meaning. Because the Court did not offer any sort of justification for doing so,
instead of clarifying the issue, Heller only served to cloud matters. The Court
should have seized the opportunity to deliver needed protection.'79
V. EQUAL PROTECTION GOES TO PRISON
Within the confines of the American penal system, equal protection doctrine has
also evolved. As outside the prison walls, change has been neither constant nor
consistent. The tortuous relationship between law and policy has vacillated, first
enhancing, then diminishing, prisoners' rights.
A. The History of Equal Protection and Prisoners
The Supreme Court began to establish clear standards concerning prisoners'
rights in 1974, when it decided Procunier v. Martinez.=0 The case involved prison
regulations concerning inmate mail and the visitation rights of investigators
17' Id. at 321 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); Dandridge v. Williams,
39'7 U.S. 471 (1970); Metropolis Theater v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913)).
176 Heller, 509 U.S. at 321.
Id. (emphasis added).
" Cf North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) ("[T]he Constitution is
concerned with the practical consequences, not the formal categorizations, of state law.").
179 See TRIBE, supra note 23, at 1594-95 n.20 ("The most obvious case for heightened
judicial scrutiny is governmental action which, on its face, distinguishes between the
disabled and the nondisabled to the detriment of the former.").
110 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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employed by inmates' lawyers. The Court upheld the right of inmates to
communicate with their attorneys via investigators.' The Court held that prison
officials may not infringe attorney access, a fundamental right, by means of blanket
regulations.8 2 Because mail censorship involves the rights of both inmates and
non-inmates, infringement must further "one or more of the substantial
governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation [and] must be no greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved." 83 Ifthose standards are met, the decision "must be accompanied
by minimum procedural safeguards."'" 4
This decision set the framework for future cases in three important ways: first,
by requiring that regulation be based on a genuine governmental interest, rather than
allowing arbitrary infringement of fundamental rights; second, by requiring that
prison officials establish procedures by which decisions are made; and third, by
requiring that restrictions be tailored to specific situations where infringement is
necessary.
In 1987, the Court refined these rules in Turner v. Safley.'8" The case again
involved prisoner correspondence, this time between inmates at different
institutions, and also examined a virtual ban on inmate marriage. The district court
had applied strict scrutiny to the regulations, invalidating both.'8 ' After the Eighth
Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny was inappropriate when
a regulation does not involve the rights of non-inmates. It held that regulations are
valid if "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' 8 7 As such, the
mail censorship regulation at issue was valid because the Court found it reasonably
related to security interests.'88 The marriage ban, however, failed because it was an
"exaggerated response to... security objectives" and did not contribute to the
rehabilitation of prisoners, as prison officials claimed." 9
j8' Id. at 398.
182 Id. at 419-20.
183 Id. at413.
184 Id. at417.
183 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
'8 Id. at 83.
's7 Id. at 89. Reasonableness depends on several factors: (1) the regulation and the
justifying interest must have a "valid, rational connection" that is not "so remote as to render
the policy arbitrary or irrational"; Id. at 89-90 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,
586 (1984)) (2) if "alternative means of exercising the right" at issue are available,
regulation is more likely to be found reasonable; (3) on the other hand, "the existence of
obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an
'exaggerated response' to prison concerns;" finally (4) "the impact [that] accommodation
of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources generally" must be considered. Id. at 90.
188 Id. at9l.
189 Id. at 98.
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The Court justified the departure by noting that the "Martinez Court based its
ruling . . . on the First Amendment rights of those who are not prisoners."'"
Because the mail in that case was either to or from a non-inmate, Martinez was not
truly a prisoners' rights decision.'9 ' Turner called for the less stringent standard
because:
Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration. The rule would also distort the
decisionmaking process, for every administrative judgment would be
subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that
it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand." 2
This decision made explicit the Court's desire to minimize judicial involvement in
the administration of prisons. "3 The key difference between Martinez and Turner
is the level of restriction permitted. Martinez required that infringement be "no
greater than necessary."'" Turner does not require such extensive tailoring so long
as regulations are reasonable.
B. Applying the ADA to Disabled Prisoners
With the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress sought to require increased
tailoring of restrictions on disabled individuals. In light of the regulatory latitude
that penal authorities have under Turner, questions arose as to whether Congress
intended to include prisoners under the Act's protective.umbrella. In 1998, the
Supreme Court announced a unanimous opinion in Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Yeskey, affirming that Congress had clearly stated its intention to
cover state entities, including prisons."' Ronald Yeskey, a Pennsylvania prisoner,
alleged exclusion from a rehabilitation program that would have led to early
parole.'" Prison officials denied him entrance to the program because he had a
1'0 Id. at 85.
"' Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987).
192 Id. at 89.
'" But see id. at 100-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting that a standard requiring a
mere logical connection between regulation and any legitimate concern is "virtually
meaningless," and noting that "there is a logical connection between prison discipline and
the use of bullwhips on prisoners").
'" Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
19S 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
'6 Id. at 208.
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medical history of hypertension. 97 Yeskey claimed this was a violation of the
ADA. 98 The Department of Corrections argued that Congress did not clearly state
a desire to include state prisons among those it regulates.'" The Court held that
"the statute's language unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners within its
coverage."2°° Title II of the ADA explicitly states that "no qualified individual with
a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."20' The Department of
Corrections argued that language in the ADA such as "participation" implies that
an applicant for benefits must apply voluntarily, and thus does not clearly include
prisoners because they are held against their will.2°2 The Court disagreed. First, it
concluded that the statutory language does not necessarily imply voluntariness.0"
Second, even if voluntariness were required, many prison programs are in fact
voluntary. The Court cited the very program to which Yeskey had applied as an
example of permitting prisoners to elect whether to apply for admission.2 '
The question presented in Yeskey addressed only the issue of Congress' intent.
The Court declined to decide "whether application of the ADA to state prisons is
a constitutional exercise of Congress's [sic] power under either the Commerce
Clause... or [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.""2 Garrett seems to have
answered that question, although it did not specifically address prisons. Lower
courts have considered that context. In Bane v. Virginia Department of
Corrections, the district court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed the
ADA claim of a prisoner, holding that Congress exceeded its Section Five
authority.2"6 Foretelling Garrett, and borrowing heavily from the language in
Boerne, the court held that Congress had created a new substantive right rather than
enforcing an existing one.207 The court found that Congress did not specify the type
of discrimination it sought to prohibit.208 Noting that statutes only enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they address unconstitutional behavior,




200 Id. at 209.
201 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990).
202 See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210.
203 Id. at211.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 212. Note that Justice Scalia left open the possibility that the Commerce Clause
might be a proper justification.
206 110 F. Supp. 2d 469 (W.D. Va. 2000).
207 Id. at 476.
208 Id. at 473.
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permissible discrimination against disabled persons, as defined in Cleburne, and
unconstitutional discrimination.2 As such, the ADA appears to prohibit both
varieties. The court stated that "the ADA [does not have] particular congruence
with the unconstitutional conduct it was designed to prohibit." 2'0 The court went
on to find that "the ADA is unlimited in its scope, has the potential to affect all state
employers and programs, and in fact, is likely to prohibit significantly more
employment decisions and programs than would be found unconstitutional."
2 'I
Yeskey affirmed Congress' intention to protect disabled prisoners. Bane and
Garrett have denied the will of the elected branch by using federalist principles that
the Founders never intended. Only heightened scrutiny cases can escape the death
knell sounded in Bane. So long as the judiciary confines mentally disabled
prisoners' claims to rational basis review, official discrimination will have no foe
in court.
C. Defining Mentally Disabled Prisoners as a Class
Mentally disabled prisoners fit more than one class. A court could find that
they belong in the disabled class,212 the prisoner class, or a combination of these.
The classification may dictate the outcome of a case.
A claim brought on the basis of prisoner status would restrict court jurisdiction
to government action which does not meet the standard set forth by the Supreme
Court in Turner v. Safely:213 "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.""2 4 This standard applies to all prisoner equal protection
claims, and does not take into account additional circumstances such as disability.215
As such, disabled prisoners do not receive the same level of protection available to
non-prisoners with the same disabilities.
This level of review for inmates' constitutional claims, together with the
Supreme Court's position that persons with mental disabilities are not
politically powerless nor subject to discriminatory treatment for which
classifications based upon mental disability should receive courts' strict
2M Id.
210 Id. at 474.
2I Id. at 477.
212 Under the ADA, mental disability is considered part of the general disabled class,
rather than a distinct subset. Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,439
(1985) (considering mental retardation as a classification).
213 482 U.S. 78 (1986).
14 Id. at 89.
215 See Stone, supra note 15, at 319.
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scrutiny, appears to relegate to obscurity inmates' equal protection claims
that allege discrimination based upon mental disability." 6
By viewing mentally disabled prisoners merely as prisoners, the Turner standard
allows valid claims to go unanswered. Unequal treatment goes unchecked.
Prisoners with mental disabilities are often denied access to programs, including
rehabilitation and training programs that improve their participants' chances for
early release.2" 7 Without the opportunity to participate, these prisoners frequently
spend more time in prison than their non-disabled counterparts.2"8 They also leave
prison less equipped to cope, resulting in a higher recidivism rate.2" 9 Classifying
mentally disabled prisoners as mere prisoners marks them with tangible and
detrimental effect. The same label yields distinct treatment.
Mentally disabled prisoners also experience a different predicament than
disabled non-inmates. One could argue that the disabled as a general group are no
longer politically powerless.22° Legislation, primarily the ADA, has opened the
door to legal recourse for disabled people, creating publicity and, inevitably, greater
political power for those affected.22" ' Although many might argue that this power
is as yet insufficient, the proverbial ball has begun rolling. The present Supreme
216 Id. (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-45).
217 Id. at 334 ("[Sjome prison officials 'reserve' rehabilitation programs for inmates that
prison officials believe will benefit from the most, almost categorically excluding
participation by inmates with mental disabilities.").
21 Id. at 286.
219 Id.
220 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443 (1985) ("[T]he distinctive legislative response
[demonstrates that] lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies
a... need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary."). Note that the courts will not
enforce the legislative response if the defendant is a state.
"2 See, e.g., Kathi Wolfe, Things are Looking Up: Some Progress is Evident in Media
Depictions of People With Disabilities; ADA and the Media: The Good News & the Bad
News About Changing Attitudes, PARAPLEGIA NEWS, Jan. 1997, at 51:
When asked if media depictions of people with disabilities have improved since
ADA's passage, [Media Access Awards co-producer Tari Susan] Hartman says
some progress is evident.... Pat Pound, interim director of the Texas Governor's
Committee on People With Disabilities, [says,] "Here's another example. A small-
town official got upset over a curb cut [for wheelchair access] ... and tried to have
it removed. This caused a furor in the community. People used the media to express




Court prefers to let that ball take its natural course without undue - in its view
judicial influence.
As a subgroup, mentally disabled prisoners are a different story. Prisoner's
rights in general are not a popular political topic, at least not when it comes to
enforcing or enhancing rights.222 Many credit increasingly strict incarceration
policies with declining crime rates. 23 Prisoners have few champions in the public,
let alone the political arena. The public and politicians have turned a deaf ear to
claims of unfair treatment in the belief, perhaps correct to a degree, that prisoners
sue because they have nothing better to do. 4 Consequently, those with valid
claims cannot hail that deaf ear.225
Because many mentally disabled prisoners have no voting power of their
own,226 and they are unable to summon any significant political power from the
public, they are a discrete and insular minority. One might argue that prisoners are
supposed to have less rights and reduced power, but that is by virtue of their status
as prisoners. Disabled prisoners sustain a double detriment: a position
(incarceration) worsened by disability without sharing in the developing political
22' Restricting rights, on the other hand, meets with favor:
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), passed in 1995, ensured that in most
cases involving prisoner's rights the federal courts would no longer be able to use
consent decrees - the most common and effective vehicles for correcting
unconstitutionally brutal conditions in state prisons. Like most court-stripping
measures, the PLRA does not deprive people of their constitutional rights in theory;
it simply deprives them of their remedies when rights are violated. The stated
purpose of this law was to curb frivolous suits by prisoners; its primary effect will
be to facilitate their brutalization. Still, the PLRA was a popular law, perhaps
because many people believe that prisons are like motels with good gym facilities
and color TVs, or because prisoners are not generally considered deserving of
human rights.
Wendy Kaminer, Taking Liberties: The New Assault on Freedom, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Jan. 1999-Feb. 1999, at 33 (citing Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §
3626(1996)).
223 See, e.g., Andrew Peyton Thomas, More Time, Less Crime, THE WEEKLY STANDARD,
Nov. 1998-Dec. 1998, at 20.
224 See 141 CONG. REC. S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(describing an inmate suing over a bad haircut); 141 CONG. REC. S7526 (daily ed. May 25,
1995) (statement of Sen. Kyle) (describing inmate lawsuits as "recreational activity").
22 See, e.g., William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section
1983 Suits in Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610,625 (1979) (stating that a study of five
federal districts found "no assurance that meritorious cases were sorted out from frivolous
ones. There are many indications that cases were bureaucratically processed rather than
adjudicated.").
226 See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (eliminating right to vote for convicted felons).
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attention, and a position (disability) worsened by incarceration without benefit of
therapeutic treatment. Individually, the detriments are either mitigated or justified,
one by political power, the other by desertion. Put together, each circumstance
negates the other. Political power is eliminated at the prison gate. Deserved
punishment is made worse for the disabled than it is for the non-disabled. Mentally
disabled prisoners are not similarly situated to either disabled non-inmates or non-
disabled inmates. Equal protection requires that disabled prisoners receive, at the
very least, the same level of protection and rights enjoyed by other prisoners.
Requiring heightened scrutiny would not mean that greater numbers of undeserving
prisoners would secure increased rights. Under a heightened scrutiny standard,
courts will still reject frivolous cases, but meritorious claims will secure the hearing
they warrant.
CONCLUSION
The decades-old "war on crime" in America has made convicts a popular
bogeyman. While few would dispute that most criminalsjustly deserve punishment,
the emotional response to crime should not overwhelm a sense of fairness. A
significant number of American inmates do not belong in jail. Some are there
merely for the fact that they are mentally disabled, having committed no crime at
all.227 Many have engaged in antisocial behavior that might have been averted by
appropriate preventative treatment. 28 Even if Americans are unwilling to excuse
responsibility for such behavior, the current approach to dealing with these
individuals is inappropriate. Treating mentally disabled inmates like other inmates,
by subjecting them to an environment with which they are less able to cope, is
ineffective if rehabilitation is truly a goal of the penal system. Treating these
inmates differently from the rest, by denying equal opportunities and thereby
causing longer sentences, is unfair if retribution is the goal.
The resulting quandary will not be resolved by politicians uninterested in
appearing sympathetic to prisoners' rights, nor by a public uninformed about the
nature of the problem. Prison officials, who must work with limited resources and
ever-increasing numbers of prisoners, are unable to solve the problem. With no
effective political force animating a move toward a realistic and decent solution,
mentally disabled prisoners have no choice but to seek help in court. The Supreme
Court must recognize the right and responsibility of the federal government to
protect the most basic rights of this isolated class. The power to do justice must be
freed from the fetters wrought upon Congress and the judiciary by cases like Turner
and Seminole Tribe.
227 Stone, supra note 15, at 292 ("[A] nationwide survey of 1,391 jails disclosed that
twenty-nine percent of the jails sometimes incarcerate persons with mental disorders who
have no criminal charges against them." (citation omitted)).
2 Id. at 291.
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Justice Marshall's dissent in Cleburne demonstrates the Court's uncomfortable
relationship with rational basis review. 29 Justice Souter's dissent in Seminole Tribe
exposes the dubious nature of total sovereign immunity.23° With its ongoing efforts
to redistribute poweramong the various governmental entities, the Court has shifted
rights in a way that is perhaps not recognized by all and is (hopefully) unintended:
In an effort to ensure that federal actions do not diminish states' rights, the Court
has elevated states' rights above individual rights.
The Supreme Court's zeal for states' rights is misguided. With the passage of
the Civil War Amendments, the federal government asserted the prerogative to
protect the civil rights of its citizens. In ratifying those Amendments, the states
consented to federal adjudication of civil rights disputes between citizens and states.
Protection for the states against congressional overreaching inhabits the structure
of our government. Congress is elected by the people. If the people do not want
federal controls on state behavior, they hold the ultimate check on Congress' power:
the ballot. If Congress oversteps its authority, the political process will rectify its
mistakes. The Supreme Court engages in a new brand of activism when it
intervenes in this process. Unlike previous generations of the Court that bore the
label "activist," this Court is not stepping in to ensure that disadvantaged
individuals are not lost at the fringes of the political process, trampled by majority
rule. The Bill of Rights should protect those lacking the political power to secure
their rights by other means. In conflicts between state sovereignty and individual
rights, the spirit of the Constitution demands error on the side of individuals: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.""23
Equal protection offers equal opportunity. Heightened scrutiny does not mean
every claim brought will be successful. Allowing a greater level of court probing
will not result in special benefits for undeserving prisoners. It will allow prisoners
with valid complaints to go to court and have a realistic chance at relief.
Heightened scrutiny will cast a much needed ray of hope into the lives of
individuals whose situation calls not for harsher punishment, but for the mercy that
a decent society ought to be capable of delivering.' "[T]he literature and cases
229 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,455 (1985).
230 id.
23, U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
232 Winston Churchill observed a century ago:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and
criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country. A
calm, dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused, and even of the
convicted criminal... measure[s] the stored-up strength of a nation and [is] sign
and proof of the living virtue in it.
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demonstrate that persons with severe mental disorders remain the forgotten
disabled, relegated to second class citizenship by operation of the disorders, and
literally punished for being ill. It is long past time that such inequities were
corrected."233
Tim Koilas
Quoted in Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; A Test of Civilization, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2001, at A15.
" Stone, supra note 15, at 308.
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